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BECKER, Chief Judge, concurring. 
 
I agree that the order of the District Court denying 
Matteo's application for writ of habeas corpus should be 
affirmed, because, whether the interpretation of AEDPA 
applied by the majority or the one that I would apply is 
correct, the decision of the state court that Lubking was not 
a government agent at the time of the telephone calls and 
that the incriminating statements were not deliberately 
elicited by the police cannot be set aside. I also agree that 
any error was harmless. I therefore join in Parts III and IV 
of the majority opinion. 
 
I disagree with the majority, however, as to the correct 
legal standard for reviewing state court decisions under 
S 2254(d)(1). I believe that the majority's approach, which I 
see as expanding the availability of plenary review under 
S 2254(d)(1), fails to ensure that federal habeas courts grant 
state court decisions the deference S 2254(d)(1) requires. In 
addition to explaining why I believe that the O'Brien 
standard adopted by the majority is incorrect, I also set 
forth my reasons for believing that we should adopt instead 
a modified version of the standard announced by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 
Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S. Ct. 844 (1999).1 
 
I. 
 
The signal difference between the two approaches is the 
amount of deference they afford to state court decisions. In 
Green, the court set out an elaborate categorization of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The majority rightly rejects the other approach adopted by various 
courts, exemplified by Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856, 870 (7th Cir. 
1996), revd. on other grounds,521 U.S. 320 (1997). See also Drinkard v. 
Johnson, 97 F.3d 751, 767 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1107 
(1997). Under Lindh, a habeas court would apply plenary "contrary to" 
review to purely legal questions and deferential"unreasonable 
application of " review to mixed questions of law and fact. The Lindh 
bifurcated standard of review represents an improper reading of 
S 2254(d)(1), because it is inconsistent with the text and legislative 
history of S 2254(d)(1). See O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 
1998) (discussing this problem with the Lindh approach). 
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cases in which the two parts of S 2254(d)(1) apply. It 
specified when plenary review under the "contrary to" 
clause should apply, and when deferential "unreasonable 
application of" review should apply: 
 
       [A] decision is "contrary to" precedent only when, either 
       through a decision of pure law or the application of law 
       to facts indistinguishable in any material way from 
       those on the basis of which the precedent was decided, 
       that decision reaches a legal conclusion or a result 
       opposite to and irreconcilable with that reached in the 
       precedent that addresses the identical issue. In 
       contrast, a decision represents an "unreasonable 
       application of " precedent only when that decision 
       applies a precedent in a context different from the one 
       in which the precedent was decided and one to which 
       extension of the legal principle of the precedent is not 
       reasonable, when that decision fails to apply the 
       principle of a precedent in a context where such failure 
       is unreasonable, or when that decision recognizes the 
       correct principle from the higher court's precedent, but 
       unreasonably applies that principle to the facts before 
       it (assuming the facts are insufficiently different from 
       those that gave rise to the precedent as to constitute a 
       new context for consideration of the principle's 
       applicability). 
 
Green, 143 F.3d at 870; accord Davis v. Kramer, 167 F.3d 
494, 500 n.8 (9th Cir. 1999) (defining cases in which 
S 2254(d)(1) would require a grant of habeas relief) (citing 
Green), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3570 (Mar. 8, 
1999) (No. 98-1427). Thus, under Green, where the 
Supreme Court has established a rule but not specified 
how it should apply in the specific factual circumstances at 
issue, a federal habeas court would review a state court 
decision under a deferential reasonableness standard. 
 
The majority adopts the O'Brien standard, under which 
"[t]he critical question is `whether a Supreme Court rule -- 
by virtue of its factual similarity (though not necessarily 
identicality) or its distillation of general federal law precepts 
into a channeled mode of analysis specifically intended for 
application to variant factual situations -- can fairly be said 
to require a particular result in a particular case.' " Slip Op. 
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at 20 (quoting O'Brien v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 25 (1st Cir. 
1998)). But query what would happen if a Supreme Court 
case provided a clear rule, but did not dictate how that rule 
should apply in particular factual situations? I cannot find 
an answer to this question in the majority's decision, but as 
I read O'Brien, from which the majority draws its overall 
approach, the First Circuit would apply plenary review 
under the "contrary to" standard even where Supreme 
Court precedent dictates a controlling general rule without 
applying it to particular facts. See O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 24 
("First, the habeas court asks whether the Supreme Court 
has prescribed a rule that governs the petitioner's claim. If 
so, the habeas court gauges whether the state court 
decision is `contrary to' the governing rule."). Thus, once a 
court following O'Brien finds that Supreme Court precedent 
dictated the applicable legal rule in a case, the court would 
engage in plenary review to determine whether, in its 
opinion, the state court decision correctly applied the 
precedent, even if the Supreme Court had not indicated 
how the rule should be applied in similar contexts. This 
result is facilitated by O'Brien's elastic formulation of the 
"contrary to" standard. 
 
Of course, where the Supreme Court has indicated how 
the law should be applied to the facts, a state court 
decision ignoring the Court's directions is ipso facto 
unreasonable and "contrary to" clearly established 
precedent. But by proposing to apply plenary review beyond 
the scope of direct Supreme Court precedent, and leaving 
the concept of reasonableness out of the first stage of its 
inquiry, O'Brien underemphasizes the deference S 2254(d)(1) 
requires federal habeas courts to give to state court 
decisions. This approach gives greater flexibility for the 
application of plenary review than is available under Green, 
as Green would require the habeas court to consider only 
whether the state court's application of the precedent was 
reasonable. 
 
A good example of this is an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim under Strickland. See Stevens v. Maloney, 32 
F. Supp. 2d 478 (D. Mass. 1998). In Stevens, the 
defendant's attorney failed to file a written motion 
challenging the pre trial use of a photographic array with 
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an eyewitness. In considering the habeas petition claiming 
ineffective assistance of counsel, the district court, applying 
O'Brien, first concluded that Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687, 694 (1984), sets forth a rule directly 
applicable to the case. See Stevens, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
The court therefore applied "contrary to" review under 
O'Brien and inquired whether the state court decision was 
correct, not whether it was a reasonable application of 
Strickland. See Stevens, 32 F. Supp. 2d at 481-82. Under 
Green, by contrast, the district court would have been 
limited to considering only whether the state court's 
application of Strickland was reasonable, since the Supreme 
Court has not specified how Strickland should be applied to 
such claims.2 
 
This expanded role for plenary review under S 2254(d)(1) 
in O'Brien is inconsistent with the text and legislative 
history of AEDPA. First, I do not think that it is consistent 
with a common sense understanding of when a state court 
decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court 
precedent. Under O'Brien, a federal habeas court would be 
able to grant relief under S 2254(d)(1) solely because it 
disagreed with the state court's application of the 
appropriate Supreme Court precedent, even though it was 
a reasonable interpretation of how the Supreme Court 
would have applied the precedent. I do not think such a 
reasonable interpretation could fairly be denominated 
"contrary to" clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 
As the majority itself recognizes in the context of the 
"unreasonable application of " clause,S 2254(d)(1) "does not 
empower a habeas court to grant the writ merely because 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Judge Stapleton's concurrence also provides an example of the 
problem with the majority's approach. Judge Stapleton, contra the 
majority, would apply plenary "contrary to" review to the state court's 
decision that Lubking did not deliberately elicit statements from Matteo. 
Although he reaches the correct result, he does so only because he 
concludes that, reviewed de novo, the state court's conclusion was 
correct. I agree with the majority, however, that the proper framework for 
analysis in this case is deferential review under the "unreasonable 
application of" test. Judge Stapleton's concurrence simply demonstrates 
the ambiguities inherent in the majority's approach, which lead to the 
lack of deference that I think is inappropriate. 
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it disagrees with the state court's decision, or because, left 
to its own devices , it would have reached a different 
result." Slip Op. at 20 (quoting O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25). 
 
Furthermore, Congress's express intent in enacting 
AEDPA demonstrates that the reduced deference O'Brien 
permits is inappropriate. That S 2254(d)(1) requires a 
habeas court to give deference to reasonable state court 
decisions where the Supreme Court has not spoken directly 
to an issue is evident from Senator Hatch's explication of 
the provision: 
 
       What does this mean? It means that if the State court 
       reasonably applied Federal law, its decision must be 
       upheld. Why is that a problematic standard? After all, 
       Federal habeas review exists to correct fundamental 
       defects in the law. If the State court decision has 
       reasonably applied Federal law it is hard to say that a 
       fundamental defect exists. 
 
141 Cong. Rec. S7848 (daily ed. June 7, 1995). Similarly, 
Senator Specter recognized that "under the bill deference 
will be owed to State courts' decisions on the application of 
Federal law to the facts. Unless it is unreasonable, a State 
court's decision applying the law to the facts should be 
upheld." 142 Cong. Rec. S3742 (daily ed. April 17, 1996). 
Given these statements, I do not think it is appropriate to 
apply plenary review to state court decisions applying 
clearly established legal principles in contexts that the 
Supreme Court has not directly addressed. 
 
While distancing itself from O'Brien's treatment of the 
"unreasonable application of " facet ofS 2254(d)(1),3 the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I agree with the majority that, in the context of the "unreasonable 
application of" inquiry, the federal habeas court must apply an objective 
standard, and examine the reasonableness simpliciter of the state court 
decision. See Slip Op. at 21. The definitions of reasonableness that other 
courts, including Green, 143 F.3d at 870, have announced, see, e.g., 
Nevers v. Killinger, ___ F.3d ___, No. 98-1039, 1999 WL 97993, at *10 
(6th Cir. Mar. 1, 1999) (relying on O'Brien, Green and Drinkard), which 
the majority terms "subjective," require too much deference to state 
court decisions and therefore are inconsistent with Congress's intent and 
the case law out of which S 2254(d)(1) arose. Just as the majority rejects 
this aspect of O'Brien, I would decline to adopt this aspect of Green. 
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majority appears to adopt explicitly O'Brien's treatment of 
the "contrary to" clause. If the majority is not adopting this 
aspect of O'Brien, it would, I assume, inquire into whether 
the state court reasonably determined the manner in which 
the rule should be applied to the particular facts, if it found 
a Supreme Court rule on point but the Supreme Court had 
not applied that rule to particular facts. But even so, the 
fact of this ambiguity, along with the language of the 
majority, suggests a lower level of deference to state court 
decisions than is properly required by Green. 
 
II. 
 
In addition to the decreased deference O'Brien permits 
federal habeas courts to give to state court decisions, I 
think the Green approach provides a more useful 
framework for future federal habeas courts engaged in 
review of state court decisions under S 2254(d)(1). More 
specifically, it focuses the habeas court's attention on the 
precise nature of the issue the state court decided and its 
relation to clearly established Supreme Court precedent. 
For example, by focusing on the inquiry whether"through 
a decision of pure law . . . [the state court] decision reaches 
a legal conclusion or a result opposite to and irreconcilable 
with that reached in the precedent that addresses the 
identical issue," 143 F.3d at 870, the Green approach 
focuses the habeas court's attention on whether the state 
court decision of a legal issue is properly reconcilable with 
precedent. Similarly, by focusing on whether a state court 
"decision recognizes the correct principle from the higher 
court's precedent, but unreasonably applies that principle 
to the facts before it (assuming the facts are insufficiently 
different from those that gave rise to the precedent as to 
constitute a new context for consideration of the principle's 
applicability)," 143 F.3d at 870, the rule properly focuses 
the habeas court's attention on whether the state court 
reasonably distinguished or failed to distinguish the facts of 
the case under review from the precedent. 
 
The majority criticizes the Green approach for setting out 
different frameworks for addressing different sorts of 
questions, contending that this may lead to confusion on 
the part of federal habeas courts. "Although we find th[e 
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Green court's] analysis insightful, we decline to adopt it as 
the basis for scrutinizing state court judgments under 
AEDPA. We believe that, in practice, it will be difficult for a 
court to determine which, if any, of the foregoing scenarios 
is implicated in the case before it." Slip Op. at 19. Without 
further explication of this ipse dixit, however, I am unsure 
why the majority thinks the Green approach would be 
difficult to apply. I prefer the Green approach precisely 
because it attempts to provide at least some analytical 
structure beyond simply restating S 2254(d)(1), as O'Brien 
and the majority do. The rare cases in which it is difficult 
to determine which of the Green categories is relevant are 
hardly reason for abandoning such a useful framework. 
 
III. 
 
Although I would apply Green, I agree with the majority's 
application of S 2254(d)(1) to this case, for under either 
Green or O'Brien the state court's decision was not 
"contrary to, [nor did it] involve[ ] an unreasonable 
application of, clearly established Federal law, as 
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 
See 28 U.S.C. S 2254(d)(1). Therefore, I concur in the 
judgment of the Court. 
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STAPLETON, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I join in Parts I and II of Judge Scirica's opinion, and I 
agree that (i) Matteos Sixth Amendment right had attached 
at the time of his conversations with Lubking, (ii) no 
violation of Matteos Sixth Amendment right occurred, and 
(iii) any error would be harmless. I write separately to 
emphasize the importance and utility of interpreting AEDPA 
in light of Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) and related 
Supreme Court caselaw. 
 
I. 
 
The court appropriately seeks to read the AEDPA 
provisions at issue in a manner that "comports with pre- 
AEDPA law in this area, which was governed primarily by 
Teague." Slip Op. at 23. Indeed, the overall interpretative 
approach urged by the O'Brien court, and largely adopted 
here, rests on the notion that AEDPA was conceived in the 
spirit of Teague. See, e.g., O'Brien v. DuBois, 145 F.3d 16, 
23 (1st Cir. 1998) (explaining that S 2254(d)(1) 
"perpetuates" the teachings of Teague and its progeny 
through a "sort of choice of law provision" that "closely 
emulates Teague."). I agree that a careful consideration of 
Teague and the Supreme Court cases following it should 
inform our interpretation of S 2254(d). I write separately to 
emphasize that the Teague body of caselaw provides a well- 
developed analytical framework for determining whether a 
habeas petition governed by AEDPA should be analyzed 
under the "contrary to" or the "unreasonable application 
of " standard of S 2254(d)(1). This initial determination by 
the habeas court is pivotal, as it represents a decision as to 
which of two substantially different standards of review 
should govern its consideration of the state court's 
determination. 
 
Echoing O'Brien, the majority opinion explains that "the 
`contrary to provision of AEDPA requires a federal habeas 
court first to identify the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent and determine whether it resolves the petitioners 
claim." Slip Op. at 19. The difficulty lies in determining 
whether the Supreme Court has articulated a rule specific 
enough to trigger "contrary to" review. Although the statute 
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provides little guidance, the Teague body of caselaw is 
particularly instructive in this endeavor. 
 
Teague established the general rule that (with narrow 
exceptions1) "new constitutional rules of criminal procedure 
will not be applicable to those cases which have become 
final before the new rules are announced." Teague, 489 
U.S. at 310. Under the Teague scheme, a habeas court 
exercises plenary review only insofar as the petitioner seeks 
relief on the basis of jurisprudence existing at the time the 
petitioner's conviction became final. If the petitioner either 
seeks relief on the basis of a "new rule" (i.e., a decision 
issued after the conviction became final) or seeks relief that 
would require the habeas court to announce (and 
retroactively apply) a new rule, Teague sharply restricts the 
habeas court's review. In the interests of "comity, 
predictability, and finality," Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 
228 (1992), Teague requires habeas courts to defer to 
"reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing 
precedents by state courts, even though they are shown to 
be contrary to later decisions." Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 
407, 414 (1990). 
 
Under Teague, the habeas court first must determine 
whether the relief sought by the petitioner would constitute 
a "new rule." If it would, the relief is barred and a 
(reasonable) state decision will stand; if, on the other hand, 
the relief sought is sufficiently within the scope of then- 
existing jurisprudence to be considered "dictated by 
precedent," Teague permits the habeas court to grant the 
relief. Like this "new rule" inquiry under Teague, which 
considers whether the relief sought is dictated by 
precedent, the initial inquiry under AEDPA considers 
whether the relief sought is governed by clearly established 
Supreme Court law. Under AEDPA, as under Teague, the 
habeas court's plenary review powers exist only if the relief 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Under Teague, the habeas court may also consider a new rule of law 
in two exceptional circumstances: first, if the rule places "certain kinds 
of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal 
law-making authority to proscribe," Teague, 489 U.S. at 307; or second, 
if the rule "requires the observance of procedures that are implicit in 
the 
concept of ordered liberty." Id. at 311. 
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the petitioner seeks is governed by clearly established law. 
Under AEDPA, as under Teague, if the result sought is not 
"dictated by precedent," the habeas court must defer to the 
state court's reasonable application of prevailing law. Thus, 
the analysis under AEDPA of whether the Supreme Court 
has articulated a rule specific enough to trigger "contrary 
to" review may be guided by the standards already 
established, under Teague, for determining whether the 
existing precedent (i.e., old rules) govern the petitioner's 
claim (or, put differently, whether the relief sought would 
constitute a new rule). 
 
Since Teague, the Supreme Court has wrestled repeatedly 
with the question of when a "rule" -- articulated in a case 
decided after the petitioners conviction becamefinal -- 
should be considered "new" and thus inapplicable to the 
(subsequent) petition. In this context, the Supreme Court 
has explained that "a case announces a new rule when it 
breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the 
[government]." Id. at 301. In addition, the Supreme Court 
has explained that the principles of Teague also apply if a 
petitioner, although relying on an "old" rule, seeks a result 
in his case that would create a new rule "because the prior 
decision is applied in a novel setting, thereby extending the 
precedent." Stringer, 503 U.S. at 228. This analysis is 
particularly apt here. Put differently, under Teague, the 
Supreme Court directed habeas courts to consider whether 
the result -- either sought by the petitioner through the 
application of an old rule, or achieved in another case 
through the establishment of an arguably new rule-- was 
"dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendants 
conviction became final." Teague, 489 U.S. at 301. 
Compare, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990) (new 
rule would be established where prior case dictated only 
what mitigating evidence the jury must be permitted to 
hear, and petitioner sought rule -- not compelled by prior 
cases -- establishing how the evidence must be considered) 
with Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222 (1992) (no new rule 
established where the prior cases rule "emerges not from 
any single case . . . but from our long line of authority" on 
the matter and, despite differences in the petitioners case, 
the result petitioner seeks "follows a fortiori" from the 
earlier case). 
 
                                47 
  
Thus, out of deference to state court decisions, Teague 
requires habeas courts to refrain from judging state 
determinations according to rules (or results) that were not 
dictated by existing precedent. Similarly, out of the same 
concern for state court adjudications, S 2254(d)(1) requires 
habeas courts to employ a deferential, "reasonableness" 
standard of review unless the Supreme Court has 
articulated a rule that, "by virtue of its factual similarity 
. . . or its distillation of general federal law precepts into a 
channeled mode of analysis . . . can fairly be said to require 
a particular result in a particular case." Slip Op. at 20 
(quoting O'Brien, 145 F.3d at 25). In the latter case, under 
AEDPA, the habeas court does not consider simply the 
objective reasonableness of the state decision, but rather 
determines whether it was "contrary to" such clearly 
established Supreme Court law. 
 
The difficult initial inquiry under AEDPA -- whether the 
Supreme Court has articulated a rule specific enough to 
trigger "contrary to" review -- is thus guided by the well- 
developed Teague caselaw, which is aimed toward the same 
end, and in which jurisprudential context Congress enacted 
AEDPA. Accord O'Brien, 145 F.3d 25 (noting that "[n]ot 
coincidentally, the Courts pre-AEDPA habeas case law 
employed this approach in conducting Teagues "new rule" 
inquiries, and other federal courts have followed this praxis 
(wisely, we believe) when construing section 2254(3)(1).") 
(citations omitted). For example, the habeas court must not 
require the petitioner to point to a factually identical 
precedent in order to obtain review under the "contrary to" 
prong, just as, under Teague, a petitioner who sought to 
apply an old rule to a new factual setting was not 
necessarily barred by Teague. As Justice Kennedy has 
explained: 
 
        "If the rule in question is one which of necessity 
       requires a case-by-case examination of the evidence, 
       then we can tolerate a number of specific applications 
       without saying that those applications themselves 
       create a new rule. . . . Where the beginning point is a 
       rule of this general application, a rule designed for the 
       specific purpose of evaluating a myriad of factual 
       contexts, it will be the infrequent case that yields a 
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       result so novel that it forges a new rule, one not 
       dictated by precedent." 
 
Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 308 (1992) (J. Kennedy, 
concurring). 
 
II. 
 
The issue presented in this case -- deliberate government 
elicitation of incriminating statements in the absence of 
counsel -- is one in which the Supreme Court has provided 
a well-established principle for resolution. Guided by 
Teague, I would analyze Matteos claim under the"contrary 
to" prong of S 2254(d)(1) and conclude that the state courts 
decision was not contrary to clearly established Supreme 
Court law. 
 
Although no Supreme Court case has addressed precisely 
the facts presented here, Massiah and subsequent cases 
illustrate the fact-dependent nature of the Massiah rule. 
After Massiah, in which statements made in a car by a 
defendant not in custody were "deliberately elicited" in 
violation of the Sixth Amendment, United States v. Henry, 
447 U.S. 264 (1980) established that statements made in a 
cellblock to a paid informant were impermissible under the 
same theory. Subsequently, Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 
(1985) established that the same rule applied to 
surreptitiously recorded statements between codefendants, 
and Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986) drew the line 
at statements wholly volunteered with no hint of elicitation. 
In other words, each case in this line embellished the 
Massiah rule with new factual predicates. 
 
Regardless of whether Henry, Moulton or Kuhlmann 
established a new rule when each was decided, given the 
constellation of factual settings and commentary these 
cases now provide, coupled with the necessarily fact- 
dependent nature of the analysis, the application of this 
line of cases to Matteos claim would not, in my view, result 
in a new rule under Teague. The facts of this case are not 
sufficiently different from those in the Massiah line of cases 
to require an extension or modification of the legal 
principles set forth in that caselaw. As such, drawing on 
Teague, I conclude that the Massiah caselaw "governs" or 
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"dictates" a result in Matteo, thus triggering "contrary to" 
analysis under S 2254(d)(1). 
 
Having determined that the proper inquiry is whether the 
state decision is "contrary to" clearly established Supreme 
Court law, I would conclude that neither phone 
conversation between Lubking and Matteo violated the 
Massiah rule against deliberate elicitation. Although the 
second conversation contains some direct questions from 
Lubking as to the location of the rifle, this conversation 
must be viewed in the context of the first and in terms of 
its substance, rather than its format. Matteo initiated both 
conversations for his own purpose -- to get Lubking to 
recover (and hide) the rifle. Lubking was unsuccessful in 
finding the rifle based on the directions Matteo gave during 
the first call, and when Matteo called a second time to 
inquire whether the rifle had been located, Lubking 
informed him of this fact. Predictably, he volunteered more 
specific directions in order to assure that his purpose 
would be achieved. In this context, it would elevate form 
over substance to give controlling significance to the fact 
that Lubking asked an occasional clarifying question. 
Matteos statements were made on his own initiative, not 
because they were in response to anything said or urged by 
Lubking. Lubkings incidental questions were not 
"affirmative steps" to elicit incriminating information. 
Henry, 447 U.S. at 271. 
 
Because I would conclude that no deliberate elicitation 
occurred, I would not reach the issue of whether Lubkings 
actions were attributable to the state. Finally, I agree that 
any error was harmless in light of the overwhelming 
evidence against Matteo. 
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McKEE, Circuit Judge, with whom Judges Sloviter and Roth 
join, concurring. 
 
I agree with the majority's analysis of S 2254(d)(1), but I 
believe that the state court's Sixth Amendment analysis 
was contrary to clearly established law as decided by the 
Supreme Court. However, I join in the judgment of the 
court because I agree that the erroneous admission of the 
rifle into evidence was harmless in view of the quality and 
quantity of admissible evidence that connected Matteo to 
this murder. I write separately to voice my disagreement 
with the majority's application of the standard we are 
adopting. I believe that Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 
201, 206 (1964), compels a different resolution of the 
agency inquiry we must undertake to resolve Matteo's 
claim. In Massiah, the Court held that, absent a valid 
waiver, a government agent may not "deliberately elicit" 
incriminating statements from an accused after the right to 
counsel has attached. In holding that the outcome of the 
state court's inquiry was not compelled by "clearly 
established Federal law" I believe we are demanding a level 
of precision and specificity that is neither required by the 
language of AEDPA, nor consistent with reasoned use of 
Supreme Court precedent. 
 
I. 
 
The majority holds that "contrary to" review is not 
warranted here because there is no Supreme Court case 
defining the term "government agent." That conclusion 
illustrates the many problems buried in the analytical 
minefield lurking beneath the surface of AEDPA. One of the 
unresolved issues created by AEDPA is the level of 
specificity the Supreme Court must use in fashioning a rule 
in order for it to be applied as "clearly established Federal 
Law" under AEDPA. In resolving that issue we must 
consider that rules fashioned by the Supreme Court are 
often intended to reach beyond the confines of the 
particular case in which the rule was enunciated. 
 
In Massiah, the Court announced a specific rule which 
requires a case-by-case inquiry for determining whether the 
government has violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment 
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right to counsel. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 
270 (1980) ("The question here is whether under the facts 
of this case a Government agent `deliberately elicited' 
incriminating statements from Henry within the meaning of 
Massiah.") (emphasis added). The Court has repeatedly 
rejected efforts to distinguish or limit Massiah's 
applicability. See eg. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 390 
(1977) ("The circumstances of this case are thus 
constitutionally indistinguishable from those presented in 
Massiah v. United States."); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 
179 (1985) ("reaffirm[ing] the holding" in Massiah after 
rejecting the state's attempt to limit it and distinguish the 
case on its facts); Henry, 447 U.S. at 271-72 (rejecting 
argument that it modified the Massiah rule in Brewer v. 
Williams rather than applying it to a new factual setting). 
Though a court must undertake a specific inquiry into the 
facts of the case before it, the inquiry is governed by the 
rule enunciated in Massiah, and I believe that rule compels 
a different outcome here. 
 
In Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme 
Court succinctly stated the analysis that is required under 
Massiah and its progeny. 
 
       [T]he State's attempt to limit our holdings in Massiah 
       and Henry fundamentally misunderstands the nature 
       of the right we recognized in those cases. The Sixth 
       Amendment guarantees the accused, at least after the 
       initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel 
       as a `medium' between him and the State. . . .[T]his 
       guarantee includes the State's affirmative obligation 
       not to act in a manner that circumvents the 
       protections accorded the accused by invoking this 
       right. The determination whether particular action by 
       state agents violates the accused's right to the 
       assistance of counsel must be made in light of this 
       obligation. 
 
474 U.S. at 176. 
 
There are, of course, fact patterns that transcend the 
parameters that can fairly be said to have been erected by 
Supreme Court case law. When that situation occurs 
Supreme Court decisions do not compel a particular result 
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without an extension of a particular principle. See 
Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 456 (1986) (answering 
in the negative the question, explicitly left open in Henry 
and Moulton, whether the Sixth Amendment forbids 
admission into evidence of an accused's statements to a 
jailhouse informant who was "placed in close proximity but 
[made] no effort to stimulate conversations about the crime 
charged"). However, this is not such a case. 
 
As the majority notes, the Supreme Court has set forth 
factors which are "important" in determining whether the 
Massiah standard has been violated. Henry, 447 U.S. at 
270. However, the infinite number of ways that 
investigators and informants can combine to elicit 
information from an unsuspecting defendant precludes us 
from establishing any litmus test for determining when an 
informant is acting as a government agent under Massiah. 
Compare Brewer, 430 U.S. 387 (police officer gave speech 
designed to extract incriminating responses from 
defendant); with Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (agent was a paid 
jailhouse informant who was directed not to question the 
defendant) and Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (agent was a 
codefendant out on bail who had "cut a deal" with the 
government and was directed to engage the defendant). 
Thus, as the majority points out, the Eleventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals has noted that "[t]here is, by necessity, no 
bright-line rule for determining whether an individual is a 
government agent for purposes of the sixth amendment 
right to counsel." Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 
(11th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). See Slip. Op. at 27. 
"Contrary to" review cannot be reserved only for those cases 
that are eerily identical to Supreme Court precedent, and I 
do not interpret the majority's opinion as suggesting any 
such evisceration of "contrary to" review under AEDPA. See 
Slip Op. at 20. 
 
II. 
 
The majority's analysis focuses upon the factors which 
the Supreme Court relied upon in Henry infinding a Sixth 
Amendment violation there. In Henry, a paid informant who 
appeared to be no more than a fellow inmate was acting 
under instructions from the government to elicit 
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incriminating statements from the defendant while he was 
in custody. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. The majority 
emphasizes that here, there was no "quid pro quo" 
exchange between Lubking and the police because Lubking 
was "not a suspect in the crime, had little to gain by 
cooperating with the investigation and in fact received no 
compensation." Slip Op. At 30. However, Lubking believed 
that his rifle was the murder weapon and he cooperated to 
"keep himself out of trouble" and to allay his fears about 
being connected with the murder. App. at 153-54a, 157a, 
168a, 269a, 278a, 291a. Lubking said that he contacted his 
lawyer, after being called by Matteo, "[j]ust to keep my butt 
clean." App. at 157a. When asked why he agreed to help, 
Lubking reiterated: "To get my name out of any problems 
that might have happened. I mean, really, to keep my butt 
clean." App. at 291a. Although Lubking did not have a 
"deal" with the government, his motivations make him no 
less capable of being an agent of the investigating 
authorities. Lubking was not an uninterested citizen so 
driven by altruism that he offered to tell police what he 
knew about the crime they were investigating. To be sure, 
Lubking was also not a coconspirator or cellmate hoping to 
win favors from police. However, Lubking's situation is no 
less analogous to cases where the Court has found an 
agency relationship. Rather than being paid, or being 
assured that his cooperation would be made known to a 
sentencing judge, Lubking attempted to assure himself that 
he would remain "clean" altogether. He had no less 
incentive to assist the police than one hoping for a reduced 
sentence, and the police made good use of his offer to 
assist. See Henry, 447 U.S. at 270. 
 
Nothing in Massiah or its progeny suggests that the 
Supreme Court intended to restrict an agency analysis 
under the Sixth Amendment as narrowly as the majority's 
reasoning requires. The fact of an arrangement between the 
government and the informant pursuant to which "the 
informant [i]s charged with the task of obtaining 
information from an accused" can be sufficient to establish 
the agency required under Massiah. See. Henry 447 U.S. at 
273. In concluding that Lubking was not acting as a 
government agent during either call from Matteo the 
majority focuses on the instructions the police initially gave 
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Lubking regarding the operation of the recording 
equipment, and their instructions to not directly elicit 
incriminating information from Matteo. If that were all that 
appeared on this record I would agree with the majority's 
conclusion that there was no agency;1 but there is more. 
Matteo made a second call, and Lubking's role during that 
call was qualitatively different from the role he played 
during the first call. I believe the majority fails to give 
sufficient weight to the totality of the circumstances 
surrounding Lubking's recording of the second telephone 
call. Moreover, both the first and second call came after 
Chief Deputy District Attorney Joseph Carroll had informed 
Lubking that "the purpose of the interception was to obtain 
potential evidence in a prosecution against Mr. Matteo for 
murder." App. at 169a. Carroll told Lubking that the police 
wanted to recover the gun which they believed to be the 
murder weapon, "but in addition I told him we are not only 
interested in finding the gun, but also recording the 
conversation." App. at 181a. 
 
Despite the initial instructions to Lubking to act as a 
passive listener, Detective Sergeant Michael Carroll 
subsequently charged Lubking with the task of obtaining 
more specific directions as to the location of the rifle. The 
instructions that were given following the initial, 
unsuccessful search transformed Matteo from informant to 
agent. After Matteo's directions in the initial call proved 
insufficient to direct the police to the hidden rifle, Detective 
Michael Carroll escorted Lubking back to Lubking's home 
where Carroll knew Matteo would call a second time to 
check on the results of the search. Carroll explained his 
instructions to Lubking as follows: 
 
       Q: What if anything did you say to Lubking regardi ng 
       the second phone call? 
 
       Carroll: I told him that I did not want him questi oning 
       Mr. Matteo outside the area of direction to where the 
       gun was located. I told him if he could get us more 
       specific directions, that would be helpful. If he wasn't 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. If that were the situation there would still be "clearly established 
Federal law," but the state court's ruling that there was no agency would 
not be "contrary to" it. 
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       able to get us more specific directions under the 
       narrow area we allowed him to discuss, that that would 
       be all right, also . . . 
 
       Q. And you said, and again you have told us this, but 
       you said basically try to get him to be as specific as 
       you can, but stay in that area of facts, don't go outside 
       of those factual areas; am I correct on that? 
 
       Carroll: Yes. 
 
App. at .243a, 248a. 
 
Thus, Lubking's efforts to get Matteo to be more specific 
about where the rifle had been hidden during the second 
telephone call must be attributed to the government. The 
government told him to attempt to get Matteo to be more 
specific and that is what Lubking did. Matteo relied upon 
his relationship with Lubking to respond to Lubking's 
probing just as police hoped he would. 
 
III. 
 
This record clearly establishes that Lubking did "directly 
elicit" incriminating information from Matteo, and I believe 
the state court's conclusion to the contrary is "contrary to" 
the conclusion that is required by Massiah, Henry, and 
their progeny. Lubking, no less than the informant in 
Henry, was more than a "listening post" during the second 
phone conversation. The following exchange occurred 
during the second telephone call: 
 
       Matteo: It's Anthony. What's up? 
 
       Lubking:I couldn't find it. You oughta get-- I need 
       more explicit -- this is -- 
 
       Matteo: What did you say? 
 
       Lubking: I couldn't find it. 
 
       Matteo: What do you mean you couldn't find it? 
 
       Lubking: Well, you said the bridge. 
 
       Matteo: Yeah. 
 
       Lubking: And there's two bridges there. There's a 
       sewer pipe and there's -- 
 
                                56 
  
       * * * 
 
       Matteo: Yeah. It goes under that cement bridge. 
 
       Lubking. Yeah. On the far side, on the side all the way 
       closer to your house? 
 
       * * * 
 
       Lubking: . . . I looked there too, but they -- is it in the 
       water? 
 
         * * * 
 
         . . . So it's not in the grass? 
 
         * * * 
 
         . . . So it's almost underneath the bridge? 
 
         * * * 
 
         . . . Was the water frozen when you dropped 
       it? 
 
App. at 141a-147a. Unlike the first conversation where, as 
the majority states, Lubking said "virtually nothing at all " 
in response to Matteo's directions, see Slip. Op. at 33, 
Lubking took "affirmative steps" during the second 
conversation to elicit information about the exact location 
of the rifle. See Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 (defendant may 
establish a constitutional violation by "demonstrat[ing] that 
the police and their informant took some action, beyond 
merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit 
incriminating remarks."). These questions were more than 
"a few clarifying questions." Slip. Op. at 34. They were 
pointed inquiries prompted by Detective Carroll's need for 
more specific information. In Henry, the Court stated: "By 
intentionally creating a situation likely to induce Henry to 
make incriminating statements without the assistance of 
counsel, the Government violated Henry's Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel." 447 U.S. at 274. Here, all 
that is necessary is to substitute "Matteo" for "Henry." 
Lubking's "monosyllabic rejoinders," Slip. Op. at 33, during 
the second conversation cannot transform his role into that 
of a listening post. Indeed, insofar as the location of the 
rifle was concerned, he was more of an interviewer. 
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Nor am I persuaded by the majority's attempts to 
distinguish this case from Moulton. Given the 
circumstances here, it is immaterial that Matteo voluntarily 
called Lubking. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 175-75 (noting 
that "the identity of the party who instigated the meeting at 
which the Government obtained incriminating statements 
[is] not decisive or even important"). The fact that Matteo 
sought to discuss the location of the gun does not preclude 
a finding that the information was surreptitiously obtained. 
As the Supreme Court noted in Moulton, once the 
government is aware that the sole topic of discussion 
between the agent and the accused is going to be the 
pending charge, "a Sixth Amendment violation[i]s 
inevitable." Id. at 177 n.14. Here, as in Moulton, the 
government "knowing[ly] exploit[ed]" an opportunity to 
confront Matteo in the absence of counsel in violation of his 
Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 176. 
 
V. 
 
I applaud the majority's efforts to extract a workable 
standard from this inartfully drafted statute even though I 
disagree with the majority's conclusion. The Supreme 
Court's metaphorical retort that AEDPA is not exactly a 
"silk purse," see Slip. Op. at 18, is all too accurate. The 
difficulty of interpreting this statute is evidenced by the 
number of competing interpretations given the statute by 
the courts of appeals that have interpreted it, as well as by 
the divergent views expressed here. Although it is not 
implicated here, I cannot help but express concern that 
such an elusive and inartful statute will often be the basis 
for deciding if someone was "properly" sentenced to death 
in a state court. Given the divergent interpretations of this 
statute one can only hope that Congress will clarify its 
intent, or that the Supreme Court will provide a single 
explanation of it. 
 
However, that day is not yet here and, as noted above, 
that problem is not implicated here. I am convinced that 
the state court's holding in this case was "contrary to" the 
"clearly established" rule of Massiah. However, I concur in 
the judgment of this Court because the resulting error was 
harmless. 
 
                                58 
  
RENDELL, Circuit Judge, Concurring 
 
I concur in the result we reach in this case, because the 
somewhat different analysis I propose, and the variation on 
the test I advocate, would nonetheless lead to the same 
result in this case -- affirmance of the District Court's 
denial of habeas relief. 
 
I caution, however, that our analysis of the standard, as 
applied to the facts of the case, may well consider too 
casually the entire AEDPA test and, in dealing with the 
issues, lose the necessary focus. I also part ways with the 
need to define "unreasonable application" as we do in the 
majority court's opinion. 
 
I suggest we adhere closely to the statutory dictate that 
the threshold through which review must pass is clearly 
established Supreme Court precedent. Only if the Supreme 
Court has ventured into a pertinent area of the law that 
formed the basis for the state court's decision or reasoning 
do we have the power of review. As a practical matter, using 
this as a starting point, we can, as here, eliminate many of 
an appellant's contentions at the outset. I note that while I 
hesitate to critique a colleague's thoughtful analysis, I think 
we need to endorse an approach that is clear and easy to 
apply, so as to give guidance to the lower courts in this 
area. 
 
As we indicate at the outset of the majority opinion, we 
must determine whether "the adjudication of the claim (by 
the state court) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, 
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States." The inquiry, therefore, should 
begin by identifying what the state court decided and what, 
if any, clearly established federal law, as determined by the 
Supreme Court of the United States, has a bearing on the 
decision rendered by the state court. We may act only if the 
state court's decision is either contrary to or involved an 
unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 
In the instant case, clearly Massiah and its progeny have 
a bearing on the outcome. What clearly established 
principles that are set forth in the Massiah line of cases 
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bear on the decision reached by the state court? I suggest 
that even though the state court determined that Lubking 
was not an agent because he was a volunteer and there 
was no agreement or "quid pro quo" for the information he 
gave, we needn't dwell on the issue of agency. Although the 
majority opinion discusses the agency relationship involved 
in the Henry opinion, the Supreme Court has made no 
pronouncement, in Henry or in any other decision, as to 
when an individual is or is not an "agent" under this line of 
cases. Its statement in Henry that the combination of 
circumstances -- namely, a paid informant pretending to be 
a fellow inmate -- was "sufficient to support" the court of 
appeals' determination that the individual was an agent for 
the government hardly equates to clearly established 
Supreme Court precedent on this issue.1  See United States 
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270-71 (1980). The majority 
opinion correctly notes that the concept of "clearly 
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States" requires that we not entertain 
habeas corpus relief based on the state court's"failure to 
adhere to the precedent of a lower federal court on an issue 
that the Supreme Court has not addressed." If we lose sight 
of this requirement in our analysis, we stray from the 
dictates of the statutory language, and I submit that the 
resulting inquiry into "contrary to" and "unreasonable 
application" can easily lead to a form of plenary review. 
Therefore, since the Supreme Court has not addressed the 
issue of the parameters of agency for purposes of Massiah, 
there is no federal law as determined by the Supreme Court 
on this issue, let alone any "clearly established" law. Even 
if a determination of the state court as to agency were 
pivotal in its adjudication and its decision, we need not 
examine this aspect, because the Supreme Court 
jurisprudence on the issue is nonexistent. 
 
Clearly, the issue in Massiah and its progeny that has 
bearing on this case is the question of what constitutes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Even in O'Brien the court noted that the Supreme Court 
pronouncement should set a "governing rule" or "erect a framework 
specifically intended for application to variant factual situations." 
O'Brien 
v. Dubois, 145 F.3d 16, 24-25 (1st Cir. 1998). The Supreme Court has 
not done this in the agency context. 
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"deliberate elicitation." We must, therefore, ask, first, what 
is the federal law as determined by the Supreme Court 
regarding this issue, and, assuming the Supreme Court has 
addressed it, determine whether the law is "clearly 
established." The Supreme Court has in fact "erected" the 
necessary "framework" in the case law. We then position 
the state court's decision alongside the Supreme Court 
precedent, to determine if the decision itself is "contrary to" 
the dictates of that precedent, and, if not, whether the 
adjudication of the claim involved an "unreasonable 
application" of the precedent.2 I reach the same result as 
the majority opinion by proceeding in this fashion in this 
case because the Supreme Court has established the 
framework, and the state court's decision was neither 
contrary to it, nor an unreasonable application of it. I 
suggest that the focus on Supreme Court precedent and the 
pointed inquiries is the essence of the narrower review 
envisioned by the statute, and will prevent us from 
venturing into the forbidden area of whether we agree with 
the state court decision -- which the majority opinion 
seems to do as it works through the elements, and, indeed, 
at the conclusion of its analysis. 
 
In addition, unlike the majority, I would embrace the 
statutory language regarding "unreasonable application" as 
the standard and decline, as we and most other circuits 
have done, to dwell on interpreting it, for as we redefine it, 
it loses its meaning. I read the statute as permitting us to 
examine whether the state court, as it applied the Supreme 
Court precedent to the case at hand, applied the law in an 
unreasonable manner. This may well be different from 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. I submit that a more focused look at whether the precise issues have 
been addressed by the Supreme Court, and, if so, a comparison of the 
Supreme Court dictates in order to answer the "contrary to" question, 
might well reduce the concerns expressed by Chief Judge Becker as to 
the potential for expansive, plenary review at this stage. While I agree 
with our preference for the standard wherein we ask what does the 
Supreme Court's pronouncement require or dictate, as opposed to the 
standard requiring near identicality, if we zero in on particular 
pronouncements by the Supreme Court that are clearly established, I 
wonder whether the result of the exercise we engage in will be all that 
different under one or the other. 
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asking whether the outcome reached by state court"cannot 
reasonably be justified," or the outcome is not"objectively 
reasonable." (In fact, I even view these two standards 
employed in the majority opinion as somewhat different 
from each other.) If it is not different, why the need to 
interpret it further? 
 
The statutory test is whether the adjudication that 
resulted in the decision "involved an unreasonable 
application," and I suggest that this says it all.3 The 
majority opinion has, as have other circuits, imposed a 
negative spin, namely, that no jurist would disagree, or 
debate, or that an outcome cannot reasonably be justified, 
whereas the language does not require or compel this. If 
anything, "objectively unreasonable" -- as used at the end 
of the majority's analysis -- comes closer to the mark than 
does "cannot reasonably be justified." However, we have 
adopted the latter as the standard. I would leave the door 
open for the federal courts to do exactly what the statute 
dictates, namely, to determine whether the adjudication 
involved an unreasonable application. I think any attempt 
to define the phrase in more absolute terms impermissibly 
rewrites the statutory language.4 I would suggest further 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We could debate at length whether and to what extent the discussions 
of Teague in recent Supreme Court cases should influence our view of 
the statutory language. See Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 290-94 (1992); 
505 U.S. at 303-05 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 505 U.S. at 306-09 
(Kennedy, J., concurring); 505 U.S. at 311-13 (Souter, J., concurring); 
Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412-16 (1990); 494 U.S. at 417-22 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-14 
(1989). I only note that Congress, presumably aware of the numerous 
ways in which to describe the confined nature of the inquiry as set forth 
in Butler v. McKellar and Wright v. West, nevertheless employs the term 
"unreasonable application," not "patently" or "clearly" unreasonable, with 
no reference to good faith or debate by reasonable jurists. Cf. 141 Cong. 
Rec. S7803-01, S7836, S7844 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (remarks of Sen. 
Biden regarding significance of Wright v. West); 141 Cong. Rec. S7803- 
01, S7878-79 (daily ed. June 7, 1995) (remarks of Emergency Committee 
to Save Habeas Corpus, reproduced in the Congressional Record). In a 
departure from the more convoluted route taken by other courts of 
appeals, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has taken a straightforward 
reading of the terms included in section 2254(d)(1). See Davis v. Kramer, 
167 F.3d 494, 500 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 
4. In fact, it is curious that the other courts of appeals concentrate on 
other jurists' agreeing, or not agreeing, and we talk in terms of 
"objective 
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that by the use of the word "application," the statute invites 
us to look at the reasoning process, rather than merely 
answering yes or no as to whether the result can be 
reasonably justified.5 I would, therefore, adopt an approach 
to "unreasonable application" whereby the federal courts 
examine the footing or basis in reason of the state court 
ruling as an extension of Supreme Court law. Only if it is 
unreasonable, is it disturbed.6 I see this as different from 
determining whether the outcome reached by the state 
court cannot reasonably be justified. Rather,"unreasonable 
application" conjures up a different inquiry that tests 
whether the state court's reasoning is or is not sound. 
 
To those who would argue that our ability to correct 
flawed state court reasoning violates the deference intended 
to be given to state court rulings, I would answer that the 
statutory standard is extremely deferential, even as I 
propose to constitute it. Congress has said that we can 
grant relief only if the Supreme Court has addressed a 
specific area, and then only if the law is clearly established, 
and then, only if the state court had disregarded the law or 
has engaged in flawed reasoning in applying it. This is, in 
fact, deferential.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
reasonableness" and "justification," yet the statute uses the word 
"unreasonable," the dictionary definition of which is, "not governed by 
reason" or "going beyond reasonable limits." Websters II New Riverside 
University Dictionary 1265 (1988). These are very different concepts. 
 
5. Nor should we lose sight of the fact that the AEDPA standard requires 
that we examine whether the state court decision was "contrary to," or 
whether the adjudication that resulted in a decision involved an 
"unreasonable application" of Supreme Court precedent. 
 
6. It is at this point -- when we examine the reasoning process -- that 
we consider the views of lower federal courts. 
 
7. Interestingly, the floor debates do not support a narrow reading of the 
concept of "unreasonable application." Both sides of the aisle appear to 
have viewed it as meaning that unless the state "improperly appl[ied]" 
clearly established Supreme Court law, the state decision would stand. 
Senator Hatch, one of the bill's sponsors, incorporated these very words 
in his explication of the law. See 141 Cong. Rec. S7803-01, S7848 (daily 
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       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
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_________________________________________________________________ 
 
ed. June 7, 1995). Another reading of the language was set forth by 
Senator Biden, who read the proposed provision as requiring deference 
if the "court decision could be described by a lawyer as being 
reasonable," and claimed that "unreasonable application" was so limiting 
as to deprive the federal courts of their power. See Cong. Rec. S7803-01, 
S7841(daily ed. June 7, 1995). At the least, these views do not support 
a need for further definition or restriction of the statutory language. 
 
                                64 
 
